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6. Free Expression and Privacy Protection are Complimentary Values 
On the question of the privacy and freedom of expression, this is clearly not a 
zero-sum relationship. ThiS can be shown by the fact that there are many countries 
today with little regard for personal privacy or freedom of expression. The success 
of the US legal s>,stem is to preserve both interests, to safeguard free expression 
and to protect individual privacy. 
There are also a series of cases that make clear that I?rivacy and the First Amend-
ment are complimentary interests. In MacIntyre v. OhIO, for example, the Supreme 
Court struck down an ordinance that required the publisher of a handbill to place 
her actual name on the pamphlet. In so doing, the Court recognized that the free-
dom to express ones views includes also the right to withheld ones identity. There 
are many other examples in American law where we safeguard privacy to promote 
free expression and freedom of association. It's worth noting, for example, that the 
freedom to vote as one wishes in a democratic society is safeguarded by the privacy 
of the voting booth. 
There are tough cases where the First Amendment and privacy interests collide. 
Tha Supreme Court, for example, must determine this term whether the press may 
publish the contents of a private telephone call obtained by means of an unlawful 
wiretap. EPIC, my own organization, dedicated to both the protection of privacy and 
the promotion of free speech, struggled with the question on which side we would 
file an amicus. In the end, we decided it was too difficult a case. But recognizing 
that there are, in some instances, difficult case does not mean as a gen~ral matter 
that it is not possible to protect privacy and to promote free expression. 
7. Federal Privacy Legislation Typically Does Not Preempt State Law 
The issue of federal preemption is arising increasingly in discussions about pri-
vacy protection. It is important to understand that as a general matter, federal pri-
vacy law operates as a baseline and does not preempt stronger state statutes. This 
is clear from laws such the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 and the subscriber 
privacy provision in the Cable Act of 1984. This approach was reaffirmed recently 
m the privacy provisions of the Financial Modernization Act of 2000 and the HIPAA 
regulations. 
There are important reasons in our form of ~overnment to continue to allow the 
states to operate as "laboratories of democracy. Congress may fail to act or it may 
act in such a way that "reduces or limits the protections that a state might otherwise 
choose to provide for its citizens. States may also innovate and explore different ap-
proaches to common problems. California, for example, has recently passed legisla-
tion to address emergin~ privacy concerns and Maryland is now looki.ng at new leg-
islation that would prOVIde importa~t new protections, 
8. Public Support for Privacy Protection is a Significant Consideration in the Legis-
lative Process 
In understanding the protection of privacy in America it is critical to keep in mind 
the central role that the Congress and the state legislatures have played in safe-
guarding privacy. In some instances, it has been the courts that have established 
rights of privacy, but more often it has been the legislature that has set out by 
means of statute the rights and responsibilities associated with the use of personal 
information in the commercial realm. 
My belief is that there is today widespread public support to establish Fair Infor-
matIon Practices for the collection and use of personal information in the commer-
cial sector. There is a strong American tradition to protect privacy in law, many leg-
islative precedents and broad based public support. The question is whether Con-
gress will accept the challenge and act to safeguard this right, described by Justice 
Brandeis "as the most comprehensive of all rights and the one most cherished by 
a free people," 
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee today and will be 
pleased to answer your questions. 
Mr. STEARNS. Professor Feldblum? 
STATEMENT OF CHAI R. FELDBLUM 
Ms. FELDBLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 
subcommittee. 
My name is Chai Feldblum. I am a law professor at Georgetown 
University Law Center and director of the Federal Legislation Clin-
ic, where we have worked on the issue of medical privacy for a 
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number of years for various organizations. But I am testifying here 
today in my personal capacity as a law professor-although I am 
used to answering questions and being grilled by students. f don't 
know; r guess the new ~eneration of students is quite different-
to talk about my expenences in employment discrimination and 
medical privacy. And instead of talking about the minute details of 
those areas, of which there are many, instead of getting bogged 
down in that to sort of step back and talk about conceptually why 
it makes sense for government to regulate in these areas. 
Now, my written testimony gives you a description of the privacy 
requirements of the ADA, and I am not going to repeat those here. 
Basically, employers cannot ask questions of employees about their 
medical conditions at certain stages of the application process. 
They can collect a whole range of medical information before actu-
ally hiring somebody. That medical information has to be kept con-
fidential, and employees with medical conditions are forced to dis-
close those conditions to their employers if they want reasonable 
accommodations. 
So what I want to focus on is why is government regulation of 
privacy in this way appropriate? I think that when government 
regulates conduct that it is otherwise permitted to regulate, such 
as employment discrimination, it can also regulate speech that 
would lead directly to such discrimination. So, for example, govern-
ment can say you can't refuse to hire someone because she is preg-
nant. You also can't refuse to ask someone if she is going to become 
pregnant. 
Similarly, you can't ask applicants about their medical conditions 
if that means they won't get a fair chance to be considered for a 
job, but you can certainly find out about their medical information 
if that means they are not going to be qualified. None of us want 
to have 911 operators unable to hear. I mean, that is not the point. 
Now, in the area of medical privacy, the context that we are deal-
ing with is that patients believe that they have a confidential rela-
tionship with their medical professional, and yet, that expectation 
is compromised every day by the interconnected research, medical, 
treatment, payment, quality system that we live in. The California 
Health Care Foundation has done a fascinating presentation of 
where our medical information actually goes, and I would abso-
lutely recommend that presentation to everybody. 
Now, of course, a certain amount of individually identifiable 
health care information has to flow through our medical system. AB 
someone who has represented disability organizations, I can tell 
you that people with disabilities have a very pragmatic view of this 
issue. Bottom line: they want a health care system that is effective 
and efficient. But precisely because the interaction in the medical 
system starts with a contractual relationship between the patient 
and th~ provider, the individual must feel assured of certain 
ground rules that their information will, in fact, be used appro-
priately. 
Now, let me end by saying that Congress, in 1996, did tell the 
Department of Health and Human Services to implement nine 
standards, and these were standards about transaction codes and 
identifiers and data security, et cetera. I think it made sense for 
Congress to interact in this way with the private parties because 
69 
the only way to have consistent, uniform standards in the health 
care system is if, in fact, government intervenes and says everyone 
has to abide by these standards. That is what eight of those stand-
ards were about. 
But at the same time, government has to make sure that privacy 
protections are built in as well. That is the ninth standard. 
Well, I very much appreciate that you are looking at this issue, 
and I look forward to answering any of your questions. 
Mr. STEARNS. You roughly have 2 minutes left. 
Ms. F'ELDBLUM. Oh, I do. My thing over here says ston. 
Mr. STEARNS. I just checked. • 
Ms. FELDBLUM. Well, then, I am going to give you my last two 
paragraphs. 
Mr. STEARNS. There you go. 
Ms. FELDBLUM. And I know that if you had gone home without 
them, it just would not have been the same. 
I know that there is controversy about the regulations that have 
been put out, but for purposes of this big picture hec..:ring, I want 
to stress the need to analyze privacy within the specific context of 
which the perceived need to regulate arises, and if there is any-
thing that you get from this hearing and to me anything about 
doing-thank you; I know you agree, a big pidure hearing as op-
posed to a hearing on a particular bill, it is to lOcus on the context 
in which that privacy concern arises. 
In the health care arena, that context is a longstanding belief be-
tween patient and doctor that medical information should be kept 
confidential juxtaposed with the reality of a complex health care 
treatment, payment, research, quality and marketing system that 
uses a significant amount of individually identifiable information 
without patients' explicit consent although with some patients' 
dimly sensed fear. 
The role of government, I believe, is to bring clarity and con-
fidence to this area. Thus, the goal of any system of privacy regula-
tion should be to enhance the treatment, payment, research and 
quality aspects of our health care system through creating a work-
able privacy system that gives patients trust and ensure that 
health care entities can engage in the marketing necessary to their 
finandal health consistent with consumer consent. 
Now, I can assure you as someone who has worked in this area 
for 6 years that there is a lot of debate and a lot of detail within 
that sentence. What is a workable system? But I think there is a 
common principle that there is a role for government to ensure that 
there are uniform, consistent standards and confidence and trust in 
the system. That is what you shf'" Id do in the medical privacy 
area, and consistent with the contl t of these other areas, that is 
what you should do in other areas as well. 
Thank you. 
[The prepared statement of Chai R. Feldblum follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAl R. FELDBLUM. PROFESSOR OF LAw, GEOR(;t;TOWN 
UNIVERSITY LAw CENTER 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, 
and Consumer Protection: 
Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding "Privacy in the Commercial 
World." My name is Chai Feldblum. I am a Professor of Law at Georgetown Univer-
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sity Law Center, and Director of the Law Center's Federal Legislation Clinic. I cre-
ated the Clinic in 1993 with the goal of training law students to be "legislative law-
yers"; that is, lawyers who are equally at ease with law and with politics. My goal 
18 to train lawyers who are steeped in law and who like reading legal text, and at 
the same time, who are sophisticated about politics, know how to speak and write 
in "English" rather than in "law," and who like the particular world of political ne-
gotiation. The goal is to produce lawyers who will actually be helpful to you and 
your staff as YOll create lepslation to address the needs of our country. I 
I also wear the traditional hat of an academic professor. My academic le/;al 
writings have been primarily in the area of civil rights, with a focus on disability 
law and sexual orientation and the law. 
I appear before you today as an amalgam of those roles. In my life before teach-
ing, I was the principal lawyer representing the disability community in the draft-
ing and negotiating of the Americans with Disabilities Act-including those provi-
sions impacting on privacy and confidentiality. As Director of the Federal Legisla-
tion Clinic, I have represented the National Association of People with AIDS 
(NAPWA), in its capacity as co-chair of the Privacy Working Group of the Consor-
tium of Citizens with Dlsabilities.2 For six years, we have worked on behalf of the 
disability community toward ~passage of comprehensive federal medical privacy leg-
islation. More recently, the Clinic has represented the Family Violence Prevention 
Fund which is also concerned with enhancing medical privacy in this country.3 
T;;day, however, I wish to draw on those f'xperiences to share with you some gen-
eral observations about protecting the privacy of our nation's citizens.4 I am less fa-
miliar with the academic and advocacy debate regarding proposals to regulate con-
sumer information databanks developed by businesses (the subject of some of the 
writing of my co-panelists), and more familiar with the debate regarding privacy as 
it relates to employment discrimination and medical information. What I hope to do, 
therefore, is share with you some observations on the latter forms of privacy, and 
perhaps extrapolate from that some observations on privacy in general.s 
A useful place to start is a sentence from my co-panelist Eugene Volokh's May 
2000 article on freedom of speech and information privacy: '''[Plrivacy' is a word 
with many meanings, and WIth such words both judges and laypeople often shift 
(rom one meaning to the other even in cases where the meanings have little in com-
uon." 6 I completely agree with that observation. While I do not necessarily agree 
with my co-panelist's subsequent conclusion that harmful analngies are more likely 
be drawn if the privacy of consumer information databases are regulated,7 I believe 
) For an explication of "Ie~slative lawyering," see "Five Cir.' 5 of an Effective Coalition" and 
"What is Legislative LawyenngT available at http://www.law'b ,rgetown.edulclinicsfflc. 
2 The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) is a Washington-based coalition of ap-
proximately 100 national disability, consumer, advocacy, provider and professional or~anizations 
that advocate on behalf of 54 million children and adults with disabilities and their families. 
As advocates for persons with disabilitiesJ CCD supports strong privacy protections that give health consumers confidence that their inrormation will be used appropriately and that permit 
the continued viability of medical research and delivery of <l,uaJity health care. 
l The Family Violence Prevention Fund is a leading national organization that advocates on 
behalf of the millions of women and children who are the victims of domestic violence each year. 
The Fund runs several major programs that deal specifically with health care and domestic vio-
lence. As advocates for people affected by uomestic violence, the Fund supports privacy protec-
tions that will give victims confidence that their personal information will be used appropria,<lly. 
"'Thus I appear before you toriay ir. my personal capacity. ~ My observations with regard to empl')yment jiscrimination and medical privacy should flOt 
be taken to mean that I do not believe there are also serious policr considerations for applying 
privacy regulation t~ consumer databases of non-medical informatIOn. Indeed, while I consider 
the work of my colleague, Eugene Volokh, see below, to be of superb quality, I believe Congress 
must be cautious in chilling in its own actio., in anticipation of some speculative long·term con-
stitutional concern. While ] have touted the advantages of Congress drafting a narrowly cir-
cumscribed bill to address a real, documented public policy evil to be remedied, so as to avoid 
cr('ating an inviting target fJr the Supreme Court to further narrow Congressional power, see 
te !imony of Chai R. Feldblum before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Religious Liberty 
Prutection \l·t, September 9, 1999, I have never believed that Congress shou:d fail to act when 
there is a clearly defined public policy problem and the recommended legislative response is not 
clearly unconstitutional. Oi course, as Congress acts, it is useful to have the background anal-
ysis of scholar" such as my co-panelists who may entertain some doubts about such actions. 
6Eugene Volokh, FrI!edom of Speech and Information Priuacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1049, 1102 (2000) (hereinafter 
Freedom of Speech). 
7Volokh argues that "once restrictions on people's speech are accepted in the name of 'privacy,' 
people will likely use them to argue for other restrictbns on 'privacy' grounds, even when the 
matter involves a very different sort of 'plivacy.'" Id. fit 1102. By contrast, my colleague at 
Georgetown Universit! Law Center, Julie Cohen, has written some interesting pieces presenting 
a different point of V1ew. See Julie E. C~hen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
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he has helped enhance the practical debate about privacy by illuminating its various 
meanings and componente.8 What I would like to do is focus on two areas where 
the concerns are somewhat different, I believe, than those that arise in the context 
of conSUfiler information databases. The best way for Members of Congress to carry 
out the hard work of figuring out what legislation to pass (and how to craft such 
legislation) depends, I believe, on developing a sensitive understanding of the con-
text in which various privacy concerns arise. 
Th! two areas on which I would like to focus are employment discrimination and 
medical privacy. Again, I do not plan to focus on the minute details (\f these areas 
(and there are a number of very minute details in each of these areas, 1 assure you), 
but rather, on the broad conceptual reasons for the enactment of legislation in these 
areas. Indeed, in both employment discrimination and medical privacy, Congress 
has already acted to some extent-and there are lessons to be drawn from those en-
actments. 
During pa88age of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Congress chose to 
draw oit Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a law that prohibits programs 
that receive federal funds from discriminating on the basis of disability. That law, 
and the regulations issued pursuant to the law, provided Congress with a 17-year 
track record of substantive non-discrimination principles on the basis of disability. 
Section 504 was not focused on privacy, and yet the law included some important 
privacy components that were carried over to the ADA. 
Congress recognized that people with hidden disabilities (such as breast cancer or 
HIV infection or diabetes) often do not get the chance to be fairly considered for a 
job because the employer finds out-through questioning at an interview or through 
a medical eX'lmination or questionnaire-that the applicant has a particular medical 
condition. In ijuch cases, the employer may choose not to hire the person because 
of unsubstantiated fear~ regarding the person's possible absentee rate or the re-
sponse of co-worlr'!rs, or because of possibly substantiated fears of higher health care 
costs that might be associated with that individual. In either case, in such cir-
cumstances the individual is judged not on the merits of his or her ability to do the 
j®, but rather on ramifications that (justly or unjustly) flow from the individual's 
medical condition. 
In some cases, of course, an individual's medical condition will impact directly on 
the person's ability to penorm the job. For example, we all want our airline pilots 
to be able to see, our truck drivers to be able to drive, and out "911 operators" to 
be able to hear. 
The ADA thus creates privacy rules that ensure applicants are provided a fair 
chance to lie considered for a job, but also ensures that employers are permitted to 
hire only qualifred employees. Under this framework, employers may not ask job ap-
plicants to disclose their medical conditions during the initial stages of an applica-
tion process. Rather, after a conditional job offer is extended, employers may ask 
applicants to respond to questions about their medical conditions (or to take a phys-
ical examination}-and based on that information, employers may refuse to hire em-
ployees who are not qualified for the relevant jobs.9 
Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Tech· 
nology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L. J. xx (2001Xforthcoming). See also Janlori Gold-
man, Privacy & Individual EmpowerrMnt in the Interactive ARe, V1S10NS OF PRIVACY: POLICY 
CH01CES FOR TflE DJG1TAL AOE <C. Bennett & R. Grant eds. 1999). 
8The work of my other co-panelists has also been of significant use in this regard. See, -e.g., 
Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 Fordham 
Intel1. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 97 (2000) (hereinafter Privacy); Fred If. Cate, The Changing 
Face of Privacy Protection in the Euroran Union and the United States, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 173 
(1999); Wayne Madsen, David L. Sobe , Marc Rotenberg, David Banisar of The Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center, Cryptography and Liberty: An International Survey Of Encryption Pol· 
icy, 16 J. M8.l'8hall J. Computer & Info. L. 475 (1998). 
942 U.S.C. § 12112(a)..(c). The ADA had originally incorporated a stricter rule which permitted 
employers to request from applicants only that medical Information which was directly related 
to the job. After negotiations with the business community and the Bush Administration, how-
ever, that provision was modified to allow el'lpJoyers to request any medical information. Chni 
Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
View from the Inside, 64 TEMPLE LAw REvIEW 521, 535-537 (1991) (hereinafter Medical Exami· 
nations). The key protection for people with disabilities, however, is that the medical informa-
tion must demonstrate they are not qualified for the job. Whether a person is qualified for a 
job wil1 depend on whether there are reasonable accommodations that will enable the person 
to perform the job functions. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(bX5Xa); see generally, Chai Feldblum, Anti-
disaimination Requirements of the ADA. IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: 
RloHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMEIlICANS (L. Gostin & H. Beyer eds. 1992). 
72 
Once employers have collected medical information about applicants through such 
<J,uestioning or examinations, that information must be kept confidential. iO In addi-
tion, if an employer seeks medical information from an employee on the job/.Il that 
information similarly must be kept confidential. What that means is the fOllowing. 
If medical information indicates that an applicant is not qualified to Jlerform a job, 
or that an employee is no longer qualified to perform the job, the merucal informa-
tion may be used to refuse to hire or to fire that applicant or employee. This in-
cludes, obviously, disclosing the medical information to the relevant person with em-
ployment authority. However, if the medical information does not mdicate that an 
applicant or employee is unqualified for a job, then that information cannot be cir-
culated within the employment setting,12 
Ther:l is a flip side to the confidentiality requirements of the ADA. Many people 
with medical conditions wish to keep their conditions private, and do not wish either 
their employer or their co-workers to know of their conditions. Often, this does not 
pose a problem. However in certain circumstances, an employee is required by law 
to divulge his or her condition, even if such disclosure is personally difficult for the 
individual. These circumstances arise when an employee seeks a modification of an 
employment practice or procedure (a "reasonable accommodation") because of his or 
her medical condition. Thus, for example, if an employee has a health condition that 
rllquires her to receive a two-hour treatment once a week, and she seeks time off 
to receive that treatment-she must disclose the existence and nature of her health 
condition in order to receive the benefit of the reasonable accommodation require-
ment under the ADA.1l 
What can we extrapolate from these employment requirements? As I noted, it is 
important to view pnvacy issues in the context in which they arise. When govern-
ment regulates conduct that it is otherwise permitted to regulate (for example, pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment contracts based on race, sex, or disability), 
I believe it is also pennitted to regulate speech that would directly contribute to 
such discrimination. Thus, the government may not only prohibit an employer from 
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy, but may also prohibit an employer from 
asking a prospective job applicant if she is planning to become pregnant. 14 Simi-
larly, employers may be restricted in the questions they ask of applicants regarding 
their medical conditions during the application process. 1S These restrictions should 
be narrowly tailored, however, to the harm sought to be prevented by the govern-
ment. For example, such tailorin~ is evident in the structure of the ADA, which per-
mits employers to seek medical lnformation prior to actually hiring an individual. 
The context of the employment relationship also justifies the fact that government 
compels certain speech on the part of some employees with disabilities. As a ~eneral 
matter, of course, government may not compel speech on the part of its citlzens. 16 
But if an individual enters a contractual relationship with an employer, in which 
certain facets of that relationship are regulated by the government, then that indi-
vidual can be expected to conform to expectations in the relationship that have been 
established through the government regulation. Thus, for example, although an in-
dividual must forgo some privacy rights if she wishes to take advantage of the rea-
10 42 U.S.C. § 12112(cX3XB). 
II After an employee is on-the-job, medical inquiries may only be made if they are job-related. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(cX4XA); Feldblum, Medical Examinations, at 538-540. 
12The only individuals who may (1ain access to thE-se records are: supervisors who may be in-
fonned regarding necessary restrict10ns or reasonable accommodations; first aid and safety- per-
sonnel, when appropriate. and government officials investigating compliance. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(cX3)(B). According to regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, employers may also provide such informat1On to worker's compensation offices upon the 
ftIing of a claim by an employee. See EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F R. § 1630.14(b). 
13 EEOC Interpretive Guidance to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9. 
14 See EEOC Sex Discrimination Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (983); King v. 1WA, 738 F.2d 
255 (8th Cir. 1984). 
1$ I do not believe there is much disagreement that speech which effectively constitutes an act 
of discrimination is within government's legitin'ate power. For example, government may not 
only prohibit employment discrimination based 0.1 race, but may also prohibit an employer from 
runmng an ad that seeks "whites only" for a jo:). The more comp'licated question IS whether, 
consistent with the First Amendment, govemmer,t may also prohibit employers from engaging 
in speech that might lead directly to such discrimination. As noted, I believe government may 
legitimately do 80. In some cases, however. the C( ntext in which this speech arises may well 
be determinative. For example, in U.D. Registry, Inc v. Ca.lifornia, 40 Cal.Rptr. 2d 228 (Ct. App. 
1995), a state court held that the j'overnment could not prohibit only CredIt reporting agencies 
from disclosing information regarding certain housir.g action8, which were otherwise a matter 
of public record. While I have 80me questions regarol'lg the outcome of this case, the fact that 
the relevant information already existed in the public Qomain was critical to the court's decision. 
16See WookY v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Webt Virginia State Board of Education f.I. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). . 
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sonable accommodation ~uirement of the ADA. that trade seems both appropriate 
and within the government s power. 
A contractual relationship also exists in the area of medical privacy more gen-
erally. That relationship has led somE' commentators, who are otherwise leery of 
governmental regulation of privacy. to view medical privacy in a different light. Let 
me take two of my co-panelists as an example. Eugene Volokh has observed that 
"one sort of limited information privacy law-contract law applied to promis~s not 
to reveal information-is eminently defensible under free speech doctrine." 17 Volokh 
notes that this protection should also cover implied contracts and explains the rel-
evanee of trus for the medical context: 
This explains much of why it's proper for the government to impose confiden-
tiality requirements on lawyers. doctors. psychotherapists. and others: When 
these professionals say "I'll be your advisor." they are Implicitly promising that 
they'll be confidential advisors. as least so long as they do not explicitly disclaim 
any such implicit promise. IS 
A similar observation is made by Sin~leton in her critique of analyzing privacy 
primarily as a "riftht to 'control' informatIOn about oneself." i9 As Sin~leton observes: 
This idea is l'amiliar in medical and legal ethics and perhaps In other special 
professional relationships. In these relationships the expectations makes sense. 
The legal and medical professions understand that clients and patients will not 
c·_nfide in them without the ri~ht of confidentiality. Even if this right did not 
exist by statute, it is implicit m the agreements under which a doctor treats 
his patients or the lawyer counsels his clients. This understanding is informed 
by decades or even centuries of custom.20 
The reality, of course. is that the confidential relationship patients believe they 
have with their medical professionals is compromised every day by the reality of the 
interconnected medical, research. payment. and marketing system that we live in. 
The California HealthCare Foundation has developed a fascinating presentation 
that graphically displays the flow of our medical information in our existing inter-
connected s;ystems.21 Thus. for example, during and folIowing one visit to a hospital, 
a patient's mdividually-identifiable health information may be sent to a lab. a phar-
macy, a pharmacy wholesaler, a drug company, a marketer. an imaging center, a 
primary care group administrator, a third party administrator, an insurance com-
pany, a research institution, a public health department, a medical information bu-
reau, a life insurer. a state insurance board, an oversight or accreditation board, 
and an employer. 
Of course, a certain amount of individually-identifiable health information must 
flow freely in our health care system in order for the system to work efficiently, ef-
fectively, and at a high level of quality. As someone who has represented disability 
organizations over the years, I can assure you that people with disabilities have a 
very pragmatic view of this issue. People with medical conditions tend to interact 
a Significant amount with the medical system. Hence, they want an effective, effi-
cient, and hi~h quality health care system, together with the best that increased re-
search and disease management can offer. 
But disability rights advocates do not experience their desire for medical privacy 
to be in conflict with their desire for an effective health care system, and thus they 
do not view these interests as needing to be ''balanced'' against each other. Rather, 
precisely because the interaction wit,h the medical system is, at first onset, a con-
tractual relationship-the interaction works best if llatients feels assured of certain 
ground-rules: that their individual medical informatIOn will not be disclosed to enti-
ties that may use that information to harm them; that their information will be 
used, within the health care system, in an "appropriate manner;" 22 that they will 
17Volokh, Freedom of Speech, at 1057. 
18 Id. at 1058. 
I. Singleton, Privacy, at 122, 
2°Id. at 122-123. 
21 I watched this presentation at a conference sponsored by the California HealthCare Founda-
tion in December 2000. It is one I would whole-hearndly recommend to Members of Congress 
and their staff. A useful summary lP'aphic: of "sample data /low" was developed by the George-
town University Health Privacy projeCt, based on the presentation of the California HealthCare 
Foundation, and is attached to this testimony. 
22 I put "appropriate" in quotation marks because the debate over health care privacy regula· 
tion sometimes concerns the scope of the 9Ctivities over which patients should be able to control 
transfer of their individually identifiable information. There are many activities that patients 
may not realize, at first blush, are "appropriate" uses of their mediea1 infonnation, and yet, such 
actIvities may be quite essential for the workings of the health care system. For this reason, 
the debate often focuses on what providers and plans may legitimately demand-as a pre-condi-
Continued 
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be frovided information about what those "appropriate" uses will be, and that they 
wi! have the opportunity to review their own medical records. Thus, establishing 
an effective system of privacy regulation can enhance the operation of the health 
care system by increasmg individuals:: trust and confidence in the initial medical 
contractual refationship.23 
As in the area of emplorment discrimination Congress has already acted to some 
extent in the area of medical privacy-although there is work that still needs to be 
done. In 1996 Congress direCted the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to deveiop nine administrative simplification standards for use in the health 
care system. These standards were to address: "transaction codes and medical data 
code sets; consistent identi6ers for patients, providers, health plans, and employers,i 
claims attachments that su,eport a request for payment; data security; enforcement 
and "information privacy." 4 As the General Accounting Office described this Con-
gressional mandate: "Taken tofether, the nine standards are intended to streamline 
the flow of information integra to the operation of the health care system while pro-
tecting con6dential health information from inappropriate access, disclosure, and 
use." 25 
Congress' action to date in this area reflects, I believe, an appropriate interaction 
between government and private contractual parties in the health care system. 
Given the inteTl'onnectedness of our health care system, and the increasing use of 
computer ttcw.~Jogy, all parties benefit if there are consistent and uniform stand-
ards that wi!1 be used by all parties to health care transactions. To create such uni-
formitr and consistency-and hence, administrative simplification-government 
must mtervene through the establishment of standards to which all parties must 
conform. However, as government facilitates the uniform entry of our medical infor-
mation into this administratively simplified system, it must simultaneously ensure 
that privacy standards, policies, and protections are built into the system as well. 
Congress took that initial step in 1996, and the Department of Health and 
Human Services fulfilled its obligation in 2000. While I, as others, are disconcerted 
that the process will be reviewed yet again,26 I have no doubt that, as Secretary 
of HHS Tommy G. Thompson has stated, after reviewin~ public comments, he in-
tends to "put strong and effective health privacy protectIOns into effect as quickly 
as possible."27 I believe the Secretary, as well as the heath care industry, clearly 
recognize that effective privacy protection facilitates and enhances the doctor-pa-
tient relationship' 
The reality, 0 course, is that Congress has not yet acted to ensure that medical 
privacy protection will exist-as a reality-in all contexts in which problems of dis-
closure may arise. For example, the mandate Congress handed to HHS covered only 
a select group of entities in the health care system (health care providers, health 
plans, and health care clearinghouses), and did not cover a range of other entities 
(such as emfloyers, educational institutions, and financial institutions) that also ob-
tain medica information. While the regulation issued by HHS makes some effort 
to address subsequent disclosures by such entities, I believe most observers con aider 
there is room for improvement in this area. 
The actions that Congress has previously taken in the area of medical privacy, 
together with the work that remains to be accGlilplished, provides us with some gen-
eral observations on the role of government in this arena. As I stated at the outset, 
tion for treating a patient or paying for such treatment-as they enter the contractual relation· 
ship with the patient. 
23 A national survey released in January 1999 found that one in six Americans engages in 
some form of "privacy protective behavior" because he or she is afraid of confidentiality breaches 
regarding sensitive medical information. These activities include withholding information from 
health care providers, providing inaccurate information, doctor-hopping to avoid a consolidated 
medical record, paying out of pocket for care that is covered by insurance, and avoiding care 
altogether. California Healthcare Foundation, National Survey: Con{ulentiality of Medical 
Records (January 1999). The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates. 
Results are available at http':llwww.chcf.org!conference!survey.crfm. 
24 Ms. Leslie G. AronoVltz, Director, Health Care-Program Administrati.:m and Integrity 
Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Health, Edu-
cation, Labor, and Pensions, February 8, 2001, at 2. The mandate on HHS to implement an in-
formation privacy standard was triggered onJy if Congress failed to enact comprehensive medical 
privacy legislation by August 21, 1999. Of the nine standards required to be issued, HHS has 
ISSUed a regulation governing ele<tronic transactions (on August 17, 2000) and a regulation gov-
erning information privacy (on De.=ember 28, 2000). 
2'ld. 
uSee Robert Pear, "Health Secretary Delays Medical Records Protections," NY Times, Feb-
ruary 27, 2001 at A14 (reporting I.hat mcs Secretary Tommy G. Thomson announced he would 
seek addition;! public comment 011 the privacy regulation i88ued by HHS in December 2000). 
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"privacy" must be viewed within a specific context. In the health care arena, that 
context is a long-standing belief between patient and doctor that medical informa-
tion should be kept "confidential," juxta~ with the reality of a complex health 
care treatment, payment, research quality and marketing system that uses a sig-
nificant amount of individually identifiable health care information without pa-
tients' explicit knowledge (albeit presumed by some patients with some dimly sensed 
fear). The role of government, I believe, is to bring clarity and confidence to this 
area. The goal of auy system of privacy regulation must be to enhance the treat-
ment, payment, research, and quality aspects of our health care system throul,h cre-
ating a workable privacy system that provides patients with trust in their health 
care system, and at the same time, ensures that health care entities can en(;age in 
the marketing necessary to their financial health in a manner consistent wi~h con-
sumer consent. 
Obviously, this is not necessarily an easy project. For example, while ~ doubt 
many observers of the current health care pnvacy debate would quibble with the 
first part of my previous sentence, I expect there would still be debate rfgarding 
what is a "workable system" of privacy regulation, what requirements "enhance" re-
search or simply make life more "convenient" for researchers, and whether one uni-
form federal standard, with fir) state variations, is an essential component of such 
a system. Moreover, I am sure there would be disagreement regarding the extent 
of marketing that should be permitted without consumer consent. Nevf'rtheless, I 
believe there is a shared conceptual principle that it is legitimate for Jovernment 
to intervene in this area so as to enhance patient trust in the health care system. 
The fact that this may be a hard job for government to do has never !Jeen a reason 
not to tackle it. 
Let me conclude with some comments on an area that represeTlts one of those 
"hard jobs" that need to be tackled-and that brings together sorhe of my observa-
tions on employment discrimination and medical privacy. We are hies sed to be living 
in a century where amazing medical and scientific advances arl':. made every year.28 
The success of the Human Genome Project is one example of such an astonishing 
scientific breakthrough. But the researchers in that project, and in com{larable pri-
vate sector projects, correctly warn us that "genetic testing" and "genetic markers" 
must be treated with caution. The existence of a "genetic marker" does not nec-
essarily mean an individual will develop a particular disease.29 Moreover, employers 
and insurance companies may begin to view genetic information as useful informa-
tion to compile, and then act upon such information for p~ses that the general 
public, and Congress, may well find objectionable.30 The princlples that I articulated 
above should, I believe, lead Congress to clearly prohibit unjustified discrimination 
based on genetic markers for health conditions (as well as for the health conditions 
themselves), and to ensure that any mt~dical privacy regulation clearly encompasses 
protection for genetic information. 
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to responding to your questions. 
Mr. STEARNS. Thank you. 
Let me start with my question.,. Professor Volokh, this is perhaps 
a more legal question, but I think our committee should tackle this 
and get the nuances here. What legal considerations would creating 
a property right in personal information trigger? \ 
Mr. VOLOKH. Sure; this is one of the arguments that is some-
times made in support of information privacy sreech restrictions, 
that they just create a property right in persona information. The 
Supreme Court has said that certain kinds of speech restrictions-
specifically, copyright law is the best example-are justifiable on 
28 Of course, the existence of such breakthroughs only makes the reality of "medical mysteries" 
that much more heartbreaking. See, e.g., Jerome Groopman, SECOND OPINION: STORIES OF IN-
TUITION AND CHOICE IN THE CHANGING WORLD OF MEDIC1NE (2000); Jeff Wheelwright, THE IRRI-
TABLE HEART: THE MEDICAL MYSTERY OF THE GULF WAR (2001); Hillary Johnsen, OSLER'S WEB: 
JNSIDE THE LABYRINTH OF THE CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME EPIDEMIC (1996). Nevertheless, 
medical advances continue to help a large number of individuals. 
29For back~ound information on th~ Human Genome Proiect and genetic research generally, 
see the webSite of the National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes 
of Health, available at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov. 
3()Certain evidence seems to indicate that such activities are already taking place. See, e.g., 
U.S. Equal Employment OpportunitJ' Commission, "EEOC Petitions Court to Ban Genetic Test-
ing of Railroad Workers in First EEOC Case Challenging Genetic Testing Under Americans 
with Disabilities Act," available at http://www.eeoc.gov/pressl2-9·01-c.html. 
